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Abstract
Economic factors are said to be one of the most relevant factors influencing
voting behavior. That should be true for the European Parliament (EP) elec-
tions for at least two reasons. First, the European Union is seen as focusing
mainly on economic issues and second, EP elections are often considered as
the second-order elections, i.e. as a referendum on the state of economy in the
national states and the corresponding government responsibility. This paper
aims at testing to which extent economic voting explains voting behavior in
the EP elections over time.
As data on the 2004 and 2009 EP elections are used, the paper builds upon
data before and at the peak of the world economic crisis and thus provides
an ideal setting to probe a bit deeper in the mechanisms of signal extraction.
The voting behavior is related to objective and subjective economic variables,
as well as economic competence signals, the clarity of responsibility for eco-
nomic policies and basic institutional features, and modeled in the Bayesian
framework. The results reveal the context heterogeneity of economic voting,
and indicate its systematic connection to alternative varieties of capitalism,
to core political institutions, the clarity of the responsibility in liberal versus
corporatist countries.
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1 Introduction
In comparative political science, elections to the European Parliament (EP) are generally
considered to be “second-order [read: national] elections”. This implies a number of cru-
cial features: First, while electoral contests in the primary arena determine who holds,
defends, or gains national government offices, any other elections, including EP elections,
are considered second-order elections. Secondly, EP elections are not only of compara-
tively lower significance to voters and political parties, but also tend to be concerned with
national rather than genuinely European politics. Thirdly, voters typically do not take
much interest in European affairs and often do not turn out in EP elections, while those
who do participate often aim at staging protest against their national government, turn
away from large, mainstream government parties and instead cast their votes for small,
extremist opposition parties. This multifaceted empirical pattern was first diagnosed and,
referring to the literature on state elections in the United States, labelled a “second-order
election model” by Reif and Schmitt (1980).
While the second-order election model fails to pin down what exactly can be considered
“national” and what “European”, there is a broad consensus that the economy belongs to
the most salient issues on both the domestic and the European level. In a nutshell, the
economic voting literature suggests that elections are, at least partly, referenda about the
economy or alternative economic policies. The classical “sanctioning model” employs a
retrospective, backward-looking perspective, attributes the economic development to the
national government and posits that voters tend to reward parties in government when
the economy is doing well and to punish governing parties in times of economic crisis
(Kramer, 1971). The more recent “selection model” adopts a prospective, forward-looking
perspective. Similar to classical models of issue voting, voters compare alternative political
platforms and attempt to infer their competence in tackling economic problems (Duch and
Stevenson, 2008).
The current financial and economic crisis presents a unique “laboratory” to assess the
potential significance of the economic vote, to assess its variability across heterogeneous
contexts, and to explore the rationale voters apply to extract politically relevant com-
petence signals from raw economic indicators. In other words: The European Election
Studies of 2004 and 2009 provide a unique opportunity to compare the economic vote
(i.) across the heterogeneous member states of the European Union and (ii.) across the
“normal economy” of 2004 and the deep financial and economic crisis of 2009.
This paper explores some of the major controversies in the economic voting literature
by testing established hypotheses in these heterogeneous contexts. This coordinated series
of parallel election study modules provides a detailed and rich data source for comparative
electoral studies which does not only facilitate the specific analysis of voting behaviour in
EP elections, but also contributes to general electoral research and allows for systematic
robustness checks of the findings. Against this background, many substantive controversies
regarding the extent and the weight of the economic vote stem from ostensibly “minor”
technical decisions: The explanations of stated vote decisions vs. the modelling of the
propensity to vote; the utilization of subjective assessments of the economy vs. objective
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indicators of economic development as the core explanatory variable; the application of
pooled, of one-stage, or two-stage multilevel models. Specifically, many analyses of the
economic voting literature have opted to solve issues specific to this line of theorizing at
the expense of any other aspect of electoral behaviour, while this contribution in contrast
aim at integrating the economic voting argument with the voter utility functions.
We present the core theoretical argument as follows: At the outset, we briefly wrap up
the theoretical issues at stake, critically review the SOE model (section 2) and introduce
the basic notions of economic voting theories and some statistical controls (section 3).
Next, we introduce the datasets which are utilized in the empirical research (section 4) and
present the main findings of the analysis (section 5). The concluding section briefly reviews
the principal empirical findings, critically evaluates their contribution to the literature on
economic voting, and addresses a number of fruitful conceptional perspectives of future
research (section 6).
2 Electoral Cycles: The “Second Order Election Model”
The second-order election model posits that EP elections are actually something like a
(midterm) contest in political competition for national government office. From this angle,
EP elections are not genuinely about Europe, but less significant referenda about national
politics. This assertion is supported by a number of robust empirical regularities:
• In EP elections, turnout is usually lower than in elections to the respective national
parliaments. Since potential voters conceive the first arena, i.e. elections to the
national parliaments, as substantively important and the second arena, i.e. elections
to local or state bodies or the EP as significantly less consequential, many of them
do not bother show up at the polls. There is an additional potential for a turnout
differential when, for instance, disaffected supporters of parties in government turn
out to a much lower degree.
• Most significantly, parties in government tend to lose electoral support in EP elec-
tions, while opposition parties, especially small and/ or ideologically extreme parties,
tend to systematically gain votes. Because considerably less seems at stake in EP
elections, voters are more concerned with pivotal issues dominating the first arena
(read: national politics) than with the political substance governing the secondary
arena (read: European politics) so that first-order issues also tend to dominate SOE.
Moreover, nationally oriented, disaffected voters frequently use EP elections as an
opportunity to cast a protest vote, thereby providing ideologically extreme, populist,
or newly-founded political parties a potential reservoir of electoral support.
• Vote gains and losses appear to follow a cyclical pattern that is governed by the tem-
poral dynamics of the national electoral cycle. As indicated above, in EP elections,
large government parties tend to systematically lose electoral support, while small
ideologically extreme parties tend to gain vote shares. These vote shifts between na-
tional and European elections tend to be more abrupt when EP elections are held at
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a domestic midterm. Supporters of the SOE model conclude that electoral behavior
in EP elections tends to closely follow the approval ratings of domestic governments
which, after a short “honeymoon” period, tend to decline towards the midterm and
to improve in the run-up to the subsequent national elections. Thus, empirical anal-
yses of alleged SOE effects typically include predictors capturing the electoral cycle
(cf. for an extensive curve-fitting exercise Schmitt, 2005).
These empirical findings have been demonstrated to be very reliable and robust and
are regarded as supportive for the SOE model. However, it has been contested whether the
SOE model is also a valid explanation for the above-mentioned observational regularities,
because the empirical picture is also consistent with a whole range of complementary or
alternative substantive explanations. Thus, we seek to challenge the common and widely
accepted SOE model of EP elections for both substantive and methodological reasons:
• In substantive terms, it is quite difficult to imagine how (a national segment of)
EP elections might actually look like if these were genuinely European contests.
Both at the national and at the European level, politics and electoral competition
are structured by the semantics of left and right so that the basic features of a
first-order national election should not differ much from a second-order European
parliament.
• Even if the alleged regularities can be sustained by empirical analyses, the SOE
model does not provide the sole, unambiguous theoretical explanation. The empirical
evidence cited above would also be consistent with a number of alternative theoretical
explanations, for instance with various flavors of directional or discounting models
of voting (Grofman, 1985; Macdonald and Rabinowitz, 1989; Matthews, 1979), with
models of EU issue voting (de Vries, 2007), or with policy balancing models (Kedar,
2005a,b, 2009). Moreover, non-centrist results which ostensibly appear to refute the
median voter theorem, might also be the result of PR rules and political competition
in multi-dimensional issue spaces.
• A crucial deficit has been pointed out by Manow (2005), who underscores that the
key variable of the SOE model, government popularity, is not empirically observed
but merely indicated by a proxy concept, an assumed curvilinear popularity pattern
within the respective electoral cycles. Empirical examinations of the model thus do
not rest on sound empirical data, but on additional assumptions which are doubtful
themselves.
• From a methodological point of view, current analyses based on aggregate-level em-
pirical generalizations cannot provide conclusive evidence for any kind of individual
behavior, since they concentrate on ecological data and do not take into account the
determinants of individual decisions by the voter. Thus, inferring individual behav-
ior from aggregate electoral returns constitutes a crucial pitfall in methodological
terms. The empirical data presented in support of the SOE model are not exploited
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in a methodological meaningful way, but provide only limited and, above all, ques-
tionable and error-prone empirical evidence. Instead, any substantively meaningful
analysis of voting behavior focuses at the micro-level of the individual voter and the
causal forces that guide her voting decision (cf. for an extensive discussion of the
ecological fallacy King, 1997).
The empirical regularities cited in favor of the SOE model are thus also compatible with a
wide range of alternative and often conflicting theoretical interpretations, and in method-
ological terms the applied research strategy is dubious at best. While this notion does
not suggest an outright rejection of the ideas and empirical regularities behind the con-
ventional wisdom, principled criticism needs to be addressed to the utilized research tools.
Therefore, the subsequent theoretical considerations and empirical analyses aim at scruti-
nizing the established terminology and the alleged empirical regularities at the voter level
and thus at re-assessing the principle ideas of the SOE model.
There are also issues with the SOE model from a methodological perspective. In pub-
lished work, empirical analyses routinely build upon the analysis of aggregate electoral
returns and focus on the explanation of systematic vote gains and losses by certain polit-
ical parties. Empirical studies essentially try to infer individual behavior from aggregate
electoral data and thus fail to avoid the “ecological fallacy”, since researchers aim at ex-
amining voting behavior at the individual level, but erroneously refer to aggregate data
patterns at the party level (King, 1997).
3 Theoretical Perspectives: Economic Determinants of Vot-
ing Behaviour
This paper examines (and explains) electoral behaviour, i.e. voter decision-making and
party strategy in elections to the European Parliament. Theoretical arguments and empir-
ical analyses have suggested that the economy and/ or the voters’ assessments of economy
are crucial determinants of electoral behaviour. The very same contributions have however
underscored that economic reasoning is by far not the only determinant of the vote, so
that a wide range of alternative explanations needs to be controlled for so as to assess the
real magnitude of the economic vote, to learn when and for whom economic developments
matter or not.
3.1 Determinants of Voting Behavior
The subsequent argument reviews theories of voting and party competitions and discusses
the application of these established theoretical concepts to EP elections. In a nutshell,
modern theories of voting and electoral behavior tend to disagree sharply about the motives
of voter decisions and party strategies1:
Ei The tradition of economic voting theories maintains that the electorate responds to
evaluations of the past performance of political parties. Note that these approaches
1Note that i denotes a voter and j a party
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are closely connected to research traditions of SOE which is frequently tested by
regressing the performance of government and opposition parties on an alleged pop-
ularity cycle.
Si The classic perspective on electoral behaviour has been proposed by the nestors of
the “Columbia School” and highlights the importance of social structure for any
explanation of political and, specifically, electoral behaviour: ”[...] a person thinks,
politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference”
(Lazarsfeld et al., 1968, 27). Explanandum and explanans, social structure and
electoral behaviour, are linked by similar political experiences which are reinforced
by the identification and interaction with social classes and groups.
PIij The contributions by the ”Michigan School” turn their attention from objective so-
cial characteristics to subjective, group-based socio-psychological motivations of the
vote. Theories of political socialization posit that voters tend to form generally sta-
ble attachments to political parties which tend to guide their evaluation of political
issue and to determine their behavior at the ballot box.
URij Rational choice-based theories of the ”Rochester School” focus on short-term instru-
mentally rational voters who, in most cases, pursue policy-based interests. Most
prominently, the spatial theory of voting posits that electors tend to chose those
candidates or political parties whose policy positions are closest to their own (prox-
imity voting) or that are supposed to change policies towards the direction preferred
by the voter (directional voting).
This contribution focuses on the impact of economic voting in elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament. Thus, we expect that a voter’s evaluation of past economic performance
or assumed competence in economic policies enters her utility function for the parties,
i.e. the choice alternatives, which compete in the election. Alternative explanatory con-
cepts, sociostructural approaches, party identification, or issue voting will be utilized as
“controls” and also enter the respective utility functions.
More formally, the comprehensive utility voter i associates with a political party j in
an election (Uij) is composed of the core economic voting considerations (Ei) and a vector
of controls, for instance long-term party attachments (PIij), spatial policy utilities (U
S
ij),
and demographic properties of the voter (Si). We thus propose a unified model of voting
that relates the voter’s i evaluation of political party j to economic voting considerations
(Ei), to long-term party attachments (PIij), to spatial policy utilities (U
S
ij), and to a
normally distributed random error (ij):
Uij = f (E,C) + ij = f (E,P, U, S) + ij = Ei + Si + PIij + U
S
ij + ij (1)
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on the determinants of economic voting
and on the determinants of the alternative or complimentary explanations and discuss
their specific contribution to the explanation of voting behavior and party strategy in EP
elections.
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3.1.1 Economic Voting
The economic voting literature assumes voters to be short-term instrumentally rational
actors. Motivations for party preferences and voting behaviour may be founded upon the
retrospective evaluation of or prospective assumptions on economic policies. Proponents
of the retrospective economic voting approach assert that voters tend to evaluate the past
performance of political parties. Voters aim at rewarding incumbents that, from their
point of view, have performed well, while they are inclined to punish government parties
that have established a poor record.
In contrast, proponents of the prospective economic voting approach, adopt a forward-
looking perspective that is more compatible with the basic notions of Downs’ 1957 theory of
electoral behaviour. The related “selection” or “competence” models go beyond the simple
reward-punishment logic, but builds on rational expectations on future economic policies.
This group of theories builds upon a number of crucial assumptions: (i.) governments differ
in their competence handling economic problems and implementing economic policies, (ii.)
voters infer alternative parties’ economic policy competence by observing past policies
and past economic outcomes, (iii.) voters are rational actors and sufficiently competent
to determine to which extent economic developments are either produced by the actions
or inactions of the respective national government or the result of external shocks (the
“signal extraction problem” in economic voting models).
The operationalization of the economic voting variables builds upon both individual-
specific and alternative-specific data. In principle, any measurement of the economic
vote needs survey information on either stated vote decisions or stated propensities to
vote for the parties in the choice set, and information on subjective evaluations of the
economy. The rationale behind this concept is that voters can only be motivated by
economic developments to the extent they are aware of economic conditions, know how
to interpret this data and know whom to blame or to praise for economic success or
malice. Anything else being equal, voters are expected to punish incumbents and to
turn towards the opposition in case of an economic downturn, and voters are expected to
reward the government and turn away from the opposition in case of economic success.
These individual-specific survey data are thus augmented by alternative-specific data,
most significantly by information on the government status of a specific party: Uij =
f (Ei|Gj , ij).
However, some scholars have criticized and dismissed economic voting models that
relate individual vote choices or preference structures to subjective assessments of economic
development. For instance, van der Brug et al. (2007) argue that subjective assessments
lack content validity, since they differ widely and systematically, while the state of the
economy should be the same for each respondent in any given context and time point.
While some voters are predominantly concerned with unemployment, others might more
specifically associate low growth and high inflation rates with an economic crisis so that
the core concept of economic voting becomes quite unclear and meaningless. van der
Brug et al. (2007) argue that inconsistencies and misperceptions of the economy may not
only arise from a lack of competence, but are contaminated with individual partisanship
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and thus introduce endogeneity bias to the statistical estimates. Voters who support
the party/ parties in government tend to evaluate the economy more favourably than
voters who identify with opposition parties. As a consequence, any analysis that builds
upon subjective assessments of the economy is likely to introduce endogeneity bias to the
analysis and to vastly overestimate the extent and the political significance of the economic
vote.
This analysis builds on subjective assessments by individual voters and on objective
economic indicators: we model the economic vote by voter i for party j as a result of i’s
subjective assessments of economic developments and the government/ opposition status
of the parties in the choice set. These economic voting considerations correspond with
principle ideas of the SOE model and provide an alternative explanation of the detected
patterns of vote gains and losses. While some propositions refer to an theoretically sup-
posed but empirically unobserved popularity cycle of government parties (Hix and Marsh,
2007; Marsh, 1998; Reif, 1997; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005), others relate to
actual, directly measured evaluations of government policies based on, most frequently,
economic development (Kousser, 2004; Manow, 2005).
3.1.2 Party Identification
The Michigan School stresses the effect of stable, long-term affective party attachments
on voting behavior. In essence, the political consequences of party identification (PIij),
a voter’s underlying allegiance to a political party, form the central pillar of this model
family (cf., among many others, Campbell et al., 1960). The contributions of the Michigan
School maintain that party identification relates to affective bindings. While the concept of
party identification has significantly influenced theoretical reasoning and applied electoral
research, its specific theoretical contents, its impact on actual voting behavior, and its
applicability as an independent variable in positive models of spatial voting has been
questioned.
Critics emphasized and elaborated on the cognitive dimension of the presumed par-
tisanship. This concept is, for instance, embodied by Fiorina’s (1981) conceptualization
of party identification as a permanently updated “running tally” that summarizes past
experiences from early socialization to current evaluations of partisan records of policy
performance: First, the redefinition of party identification by Fiorina (1981) introduces
theoretical complications into the models, since party identification is affected by general
ideological orientations, while ideology, in turn, is affected by party identification. Both
influences are causally interrelated and cannot be disentangled easily. Secondly, the con-
cept of party identification is also problematic in terms of formal and statistical modelling,
since the respective indicators will be correlated with policy and non-policy predictors of
actual voting behavior and thus introduce an endogeneity problem to unified models of
issue voting and party competition (cf. the discussion in Adams et al., 2005, 247-253).
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3.1.3 Policy-Based Models
The paper starts with an individual-level analysis of voting behavior in elections to the EP.
As indicated above, we imply that a causally valid analysis of the electoral process needs to
rely on individual-level data. Specifically, we apply current, rational choice-based models
of spatial voting to voting behavior in EP elections. In classical Downsian proximity voting
models, both voters (V ) and parties (P ) are represented by points within an n-dimensional
political space which maps the political preferences on these n issue dimensions. Often,
there is only one dimension, but here we opt for a two two-dimensional representation
of the European political space that consists of a (domestic) left-right and a (European)
integration-independence dimension. Everything else being equal, voters evaluate party
alternatives by proximity in the classical Downsian spatial model. Thus, a party which is
located closely to the voter’s preferences on both dimensions yields a high utility, while
another party that proposes policies which are distant from the voter’s ideal point on
either dimension should generate considerably smaller utilities.
The basic Downsian principle implies that vi prefers the electoral platform that offers
him/her the highest utility. In formal terms, the utility voter i assigns to party j given a set
of explanatory variables USij declines with the (Euclidean) distance of a voter and a party
alternative. Tailored to the two-dimensional European political space which comprises the
domestic left-right (LR) and the European integration dimension (EU) spatial proximity
utilities are given by the weighted Euclidian distance:
USij |xij = −||V − P ||2 (2)
= −[(vi,LR − pj,LR)2 + (vi,EU − pj,EU )2] 12 (3)
= −[β11(vi,LR − pj,LR)2 + 2β12(vi,LR − pj,EU )(vi,EU − pj,LR) (4)
+ β22(vi,EU − pj,LR)2] 12
While β11 and β22 indicate the specific weight of the first and second dimension of political
competition, the off-diagonal elements β12 = β21 indicate interaction of these dimensions.
3.2 Hypotheses
Theoretical arguments and empirical analyses of the economic vote have often produced a
quite heterogeneous picture. While some scholars referred to the profound consequences
of the economy for the vote, others recognized neither substantively meaningful nor em-
pirically valid association of both.
These ambiguities often stem from vastly diverging angles on the dependent variable.
Some aggregate-level studies focus on the vote share of governing parties or of the party
of the chief executive, while individual-level studies often concentrate on the vote either
for a government or a opposition party:
Hypothesis 1 Voters who are concerned about economic developments, tend to turn
away from and punish parties in governments. In contrast, voters who feel satisfied
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with economic developments, tend to support the current government.
Secondly, we assume that the strength of the economic vote varies across the contexts
of the member states. There are two principle institutional features which are assumed
to affect the economic vote: (i.) Economic voting should covary with the clarity of po-
litical accountability. In majoritarian systems which feature a single-party executive, a
centralized state, few relevant veto players, and high systemic responsiveness we expect a
significant, versatile extent of economic voting. In consensus democracies which are char-
acterized by coalition governments, federal states, a high number of potential veto players,
and little systemic responsiveness we expect little economic voting. (ii.) Economic voting
should also covary with the degree of social protection that is established by alternative
welfare regimes. In contexts of very high regulation, social protection, and decommodi-
fication I expect to find less economic voting than in contexts of deregulation, inchoate
social protection, and little decommodification:
Hypothesis 2 The political consequences of the economic vote vary significantly across
voters, countries, and time. They are affected by institutional structures which
govern political responsibility and responsiveness as well as social protection and
decommodification.
Another controversy in the economic voting literature is about the merits and draw-
backs of (i.) individual, subjective assessments of the economy or of (ii.) aggregate, real-
world economic indicators. Supporters of the first perspective posit that only subjective
assessments may be utilized as explanations for utilitarian, rationally instrumental voting
behaviour. Supporters of the second perspective argue that only electoral responses to
real economic developments address the political consequences of economic developments
in a straightforward and substantively valid fashion. In contrast, the “parallel realities”
captured by the voters were of no theoretical significance, contaminated with partisanship,
and thus suffer from endogeneity bias and lead to the systematic overestimation of the
economic vote:
Hypothesis 3 Individual voters’ assessments of the economy are motivated by, but not
reflections of real-world economic developments. Voters do not blindly react to
socioeconomic indicators, but process economic indicators to extract competence
signals.
Eventually, the economic vote is embedded to political institutions. As indicated, both
the “sanctioning” and the “selection model” of economic voting need to address the signal
extraction problem in order to find out whom to reward and whom to blame. Those
who want to “throw the rascals out” first need to determine who these “rascals” actually
are; those who want to select competent agents need to identify whether these candidates
can actually implement the policies they suggest. As a result we expect high levels of
economic voting when there is clear accountability and responsibility of elected agents
and significantly lower levels of economic voting when political responsibility is obscured:
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Hypothesis 4 The clarity of responsibility, for instance in majoritarian democracies,
reinforces economic voting; the obliteration of political responsibility, for instance in
consensus democracies, weakens the economic voting mechanism.
4 Electoral and Contextual Data
The empirical analysis builds on both micro-level and macro-level data. Micro-level data
are taken from the 2004 and 2009 European Election Studies; so as to assess the con-
ditioning effects of institutional contexts, the European Election Studies are augmented
with data on political party, economic development, and socioeconomic institutions.
The primary data source that includes both information on individual voter’s ideologi-
cal preferences, empirical information on non-policy related motivations, and the perceived
policy positions of candidates and political parties are mass-level election studies. From
the first direct EP elections in 1979 to the most recent ones in 2009, a series of altogether
five independent election studies has been organized and conducted in any respective
member state of the European Union under the label of the European Election Studies
(henceforth: EES; http://europeanelectionstudies.net).
For the empirical analysis of electoral choice, the dataset is rearranged to a stacked
format. While the original data matrix is provided by the EES team in an individual-
specific structure that consists of N individual survey respondents, here data is reshaped
to an alternative-specific format in which each choice alternative j of each voter i is an
observation and N ·K observations are accumulated in the dataset, where N denotes the
number of respondents and K the number of parties. Thus the number of observations
amounts to 24,679 individual respondents for the 2004 EES and to 27,069 respondents
for the 2009 EES. The analysis includes all the EU member countries in a given year,
the dataset needed to be transformed to an alternative-specific layout so as to facilitate
the statistical analysis by discrete choice and/ or hierarchical regression models. In the
current dataset, the number of individuals is thus multiplied by the context-specific number
of alternatives (= electoral lists or political parties) in the choice set of each individual
respondent yielding an integrated dataset that contains the evaluations of more than
400,000 alternatives by more than 50,000 survey respondents.
The estimation of the economic voting models spelled out above depends on the avail-
ability of survey data that includes both information on propensity to vote and on subjec-
tive assessments of economic developments. Among the EES studies, only the two most
recent ones that have been conducted in the aftermath of the 2004 and 2009 EP elections
provide detailed information on recalled voting behavior in national and EP elections,
stated party identification, individual and party positions within either dimension of the
European political space, and, most significantly, assessments of the recent as well as
future economic development:
PTVij – Stated Propensity to Vote/ Stated Utilities The EES modules since
1989 include scalometers on which the survey respondents indicate the“Probability to
ever vote for the following parties” from“not at all probable”(1) to“very probable” (10).
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Some contributions have taken these PTV thermometer scores as stated utilities for the
various political parties which compete in an election (van der Brug et al., 2007). If one
provisionally accepts this perspective, the information provided by the PTV question goes
significantly beyond the information given by the simple vote question and also includes
(more fine-grained) assessments of utilities for those parties that where not the voter’s first
choice. Critics argue however that the PTV item lacks content validity since it remains
to be shown whether political preferences and political behaviour are strictly congruent
or not. Moreover, it remains unclear and undefined whether the PTV refers to national
elections, EP elections, or a very general propensity to consider the party at whatever
electoral contest.
Ei – Subjective Retrospective Assessments of Economic Development Subjec-
tive evaluations of economic development are available in the two most recent waves of the
EES, 2004 and 2009. These data are assessed as sociotropic, retrospective assessments:
“What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that
the general economic situation in [YOUR COUNTRY] is ...” In turn, survey respondents
asked to assess national economic development on a five point scale: (1) “a lot better”,
(2) “a little better”, (3) “stayed the same”, (4) “a little worse”, and (5) “a lot worse”.
PIij – Party Identification Party identification is usually assessed by the following
survey item: “Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which
party do you feel close to?” Given the alternative-specific structure of the dataset P is
inserted as a dummy variable that indicates whether a respondent identifies with a party
alternative or not.
The European Election Studies of 2004 and 2009 form the principal empirical basis
for the subsequent empirical analysis. About half of the observations were gathered in
the context of a “normal economy” (2004), the remaining half were acquired at the peak
of a significant economic downturn and financial crisis (2009). We believe that this stark
and historically almost unique contrast helps to probe more deeply into problems of sig-
nal extraction and electoral behaviour in selection models of economic voting. The EES
not only provide a rich, solid empirical foundation for the analysis of EP elections, but
the parallel conduct of coordinated survey modules across the EU member states and EP
elections makes it an ideal basis for any empirically rich study of contextual effects on and
heterogeneity of electoral behaviour. In terms of the non-policy predictors, survey respon-
dents are asked to provide information whether they hold a certain party identification,
and the EES also report standard demographic information such as the respondents’ age
or gender.
4.1 Economic Development and Political Regulation
The EES data are augmented with data on government participation derived from the
ParlGov database (http://www.ParlGov.org) so that a meaningful identification of gov-
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ernment and opposition parties becomes feasible:
Gj – Government Participation Ultimately, the survey evidence complemented with
real-world economic indicators which capture the short-term development of principle
economic indicators (for instance growth, inflation, or unemployment) and also capture
long-term stable regulation regimes at the national level (for instance the taxation of
labour, data on productivity, income, and social inequality).
Growth, Inflation, Unemployment – Indicators of Short-Term Economic De-
velopment These indices assess various dimensions of current, volatile economic devel-
opment, which are each considered salient to different socioeconomic groups of voters and
political parties and affect the survey respondents’ assessments of the economy. Economic
voting theories posit that voters care about these basic indicators and respond to the
booms and slumps of the economy by either “sanctioning” incumbents in a backward-
looking strategy or by “selecting” competent economic managers in a forward-looking
perspective.
As indicated, different socioeconomic groups might feel threatened by recession, unem-
ployment, or high inflation to a very different extent. Among these core indicators, only
economic growth and unemployment continue to be properties of national economy in a
strict sense, while inflation indicators have empirically converged because of the global
economy and within the European Union, by definition, as of the fiscal policy convergence
instituted by the Euro.
Productivity, Income Inequality, Taxes on Labour – Indicators of Political
Regulation These indicators refer to long-term, stable socioeconomic contexts, to the
competitiveness of the national economy, the degree of social protection, and levels of
decommodification. Although these indicators do not directly capture economic develop-
ments, they indicate how far individual citizens are isolated and protected from markets
and market failures by socioeconomic institutions. Thus, socioeconomic institutions define
the citizen’s degree of vulnerability and thus are expected to exert a strong impact on the
economic vote.
The Clarity of Political Responsibility, majoritarian vs. consociational democ-
racy Eventually, the political and institutional exerts a significant effect on the economic
vote. In high clarity conditions, voters are easily able to extract compentency signals and
to understand which parts of the economic development occur due to government ac-
tions and which parts due to external shocks. In contrast, consociational democracies
tend to blur political responsibility and prevent the identification of responsible actors.
In this papers we assess the stable features of majoritarian or consociational democracies
by scores on the “executive-parties” and on the “federal-unity” dimensions taken from
Lijphart (1999)
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5 Empirical Findings: Economic Determinants of Voting
Behaviour
5.1 The Statistical Model
The conceptual research design draws upon a suggestion by Przeworski and Teune (1970)
who assign a novel meaning to the concept of “comparative research” which, in their
terms, exclusively relates to studies “(...) in which the influence of larger systems upon
the characteristics of units within them is examined (...) In this sense not all the studies
conducted across systems or nations are comparative. (...) If the analysis is conducted
exclusively at the level of nations, then (...) it is not comparative” (Przeworski and Teune,
1970, 74).
The “most different systems design” instead refers to a hierarchically ordered multilevel
context: “Comparative research is inquiry in which more than one level of analysis is
possible” (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, 37). Thus, a cross-level research design provides
a vantage point for assessing the robustness of sub-systemic relations, most importantly
general, well-established propositions like general theories of electoral behaviour and party
competition.
5.1.1 Partly Pooled Multilevel Model
The methodology spelled out in “The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry” closely re-
sembles modern multilevel analysis. The move towards these novel methods has rapidly
gained momentum in empirical political science (for an introduction to applied multi-
level analysis cf. the textbooks by Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007;
Jackman, 2009; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). In case
that lower-level (“micro”) units are nested within higher-level (“macro”) units, the micro-
macro link is explored by these modern tools for multilevel analysis which have quickly
become the standard of applied research in comparative politics. These novel methods
enable researchers to link outcomes at the individual level to institutional or economic
contexts at the polity level, while large-scale comparative datasets, for instance the EES
survey series, provide a rich and extensive empirical foundation. In other words: Causal
relations at the micro-level are allowed to vary from one context to another, while the
variation is (supposed to be) accounted for by context-level conditions.
As a dependent variable we use propensity to vote which are, as suggested by van der
Brug et al. (2007), interpreted as stated utilities. The statistical specification takes the
form of a linear hierarchical model:
PTVij = β0j + β1jEi + γC + ij (5)
Here the continuous dependent variable PTVij indicates the utility voter i attaches to
party/ candidate j; Ei reports voter i’s assessment of the economy, and C introduces a
matrix of control variables. C includes following variables: voter’s i positioning on the left-
right dimension, vi,LR, voter’s i positioning on the European interaction dimension vi,EU ,
14
interaction of those two dimensions, party identification, PIij , government participation of
party j, Gj , and the interaction effect of government participation and voter’s i assessment
of the economy.
The models that are being estimated have the following structure. The first model
includes varying intercept, depending on the party, and can be written as:
PTVij = β0j +β1Ei +γ1Vi,LR +γ2Vi,EU +γ3Vi,LR ∗Vi,EU +γ4PIij +γ5Gj +γ6Gj ∗Ei (6)
The second model use in the estimations uses varying intercept and varying slope. The
latter only for the economic assessment variable differentiated across the parties.
PTVij = β0j + β1jEi + γ1Vi,LR + γ2Vi,EU + γ3Vi,LR ∗ Vi,EU + γ4PIij + γ5Gj + γ6Gj ∗ Ei (7)
Both models are estimated using Bayesian inference methods, as presented for example
by Gelman and Hill (2007), Jackman (2009). In this setting we apply non-informative
priors.
5.1.2 Two-Step Strategies
Rather than (partly) pooling the contexts and estimating parameters and random coeffi-
cients in one step, two-step strategies estimate the quantities of interest separately for each
context “country-years” in our case) in the first step and then account for the variation
of these parameters by contextual data in the second step. Datasets that collect national
surveys generally feature a special structure, since the number of countries tends to be
limited, while larger country-specific survey samples (N ∼ 1, 000) allow for the separate
but consistent estimation of micro-level variances and covariances within each macro-level
”data cluster”. Given these types and structures of comparative data, a two-step strat-
egy often provide a feasible, flexible, and statistically less demanding alternative to the
estimation of fully-integrated multilevel models: The first step adheres to estimating the
micro-level model within each macro-level context so as to derive estimates of the micro-
level parameters.
The successive second step explores the variation of the estimated parameters and
relates them to context-level predictors. Theoretically, anything that can be achieved
in a two-step approach, can also be done in one step and vice versa. The feasibility of
either fully-integrated or two-step models crucially depends on the dimensionality of the
dataset and the objectives of statistical inference. The literature explicitly recommends to
application of two-step strategies when the number of macro-level observations is limited
and thus renders the computation of fully-integrated models problematic.2
Particularly, two-step strategies offer additional flexibility in statistical modelling. At
the micro level, it is, for instance, feasible to utilize different sets of independent variables
from one context to another or to estimate more sophisticated statistical models. At the
macro-level, these approaches allow for the handling of more complicated error structures,
2Scholarly advice on the lower limit for the applicability of fully-integrated one-step models differs
somewhat; the instructions range from about 30 to 50 (cf. Bowers and Drake, 2005).
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for instance when the contextual units exhibit a time-series-cross-section structure. Ul-
timately, turning to more pragmatic aspects, the practical estimation of fully-integrated
nonlinear multilevel models is still computationally demanding and thus often rather im-
practical, while a functionally equivalent two-step model might be easier to set up and can
be estimated much faster (for a demonstration that the efficiency of a one step-strategy is
maintained in two-steps cf. Long Jusko and Shivley, 2005).
5.2 Estimation Results
There is a context-dependency of the economic vote. The two hierarchical models we
used include individual voters i which are nested in the party alternatives j. Stated utili-
ties, PTVij , are modeled by a series of alternative or complementary theories of electoral
behaviour, economic voting, party identification and the spatial theory of issue voting.
The multilevel estimates from those models give strong and remarkably robust support to
those theories. Controlling for alternative explanations, economic voting still remains a
significant and forceful predictor of voting behaviour: Negative assessments of economic
development tend to harm government and to benefit opposition parties; positive assess-
ments are prone to benefit government parties and further reduce the support of opposition
parties.
Table 1: Estimates of the varying intercept model
2004 2009
Variables Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Ei 0.172 0.012 0.148 0.196 0.079 0.0179 0.047 0.112
PIij 4.604 0.036 4.535 4.673 3.438 0.037 3.365 3.5117
Vi,LR -0.045 0.001 -0.046 -0.044 -0.053 0.001 -0.055 -0.051
Vi,EU -0.013 0.001 -0.014 -0.0116 -0.017 0.001 -0.014 -0.009
Vi,LR ∗ Vi,EU 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Gj 2.023 0.153 1.724 2.317 1.001 0.158 0.676 1.296
Gj ∗ Ei -0.551 0.024 -0.599 -0.504 -0.180 0.028 -0.232 -0.125
Regarding alternative explanations and controls, there is ample evidence for the sta-
tistical significance of party identification. The core concept of the Michigan School posits
that voters who hold a long-term commitment to a particular political party, a party
identification, tend to state very significantly higher PTV scores. Sure enough, these con-
cepts have also been harshly criticized for not providing any theoretical merit, but rather
correlating endogenous variables without any substantive or theoretical leverage (Adams
et al., 2005, 247-253). Furthermore, stated utilities are strongly affected by proximity
and/ or distance in the two-dimensional political space. Programmatic and ideological
proximity on the domestic left-right dimension and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on the
European integration-independence dimension systematically increase propensity to vote
or stated party utilities. There is only very limited evidence for interactive effects of both
dimensions that define the European political space.
In the table 1 the results of the estimation of the varying intercept models for the
years 2004 and 2005 are presented, whereas table 2 includes the results of the estimation
of varying intercept, varying slope model also for both years in the sample. While the em-
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pirical results hold across these alternative models, specification tests reveal that varying
slope models provide a superior fit to the data. As a result, there is ample evidence for
the heterogeneity of the economic vote across alternative socioeconomic and institutional
contexts. The economic vote is thus not independent of institutional features, but instead
strongly affected and deeply characterized by economic and institutional context.
Eventually, we explore the overtime variation and put an emphasis on the implications
of contextual differences of an economy condition differences between those two years, as
given by a good performance of the economy’ in 2004 in contrast to a world-wide economic
and financial crisis in 2009. Across the different estimation techniques, the estimated effect
of subjective assessments of the economy on the propensity to vote is consistently higher in
2004 and less consequential in 2009. Retrospective assessments of economic development
on a five-point scale, the key explanatory variable in this study, reflect the financial and
economic crisis very strongly. While in 2004 only 43 percent of the respondents thought
the economic situation in their respective country had become ”a little” or ”a lot worse”
during the last twelve months, in 2009 more than 76 percent held sceptical views about
the economy.
Table 2: Estimates of the varying intercept, varying slope model
2004 2009
Variables Mean SD 2.5% 97.5% Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Eij 0.322 0.202 -0.075 0.701 0.012 0.264 -0.420 0.269
PIij 4.552 0.036 4.481 4.623 3.431 0.037 3.356 3.503
Vi,LR -0.043 0.001 -0.044 -0.042 -0.053 0.000 -0.055 -0.051
Vi,EU -0.012 0.001 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 0.001 -0.014 -0.009
Vi,LR ∗ Vi,EU 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Gj 1.925 0.256 1.423 2.414 1.031 0.222 0.626 1.512
Gj ∗ Ei -0.5045 0.0677 -0.6293 -0.3761 -0.1813 0.0473 -0.2792 -0.0962
One can notice that also when looking at the figure 5.2, where the estimates of the
varying slope conditioned on the party alternative +/- standard deviation are presented.
There is a clear difference visible between the estimates for 2004 and those for 2009.
(a) Intercept 2004 (b) Intercept 2009
The empirical evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 clearly show that these subjective
retrospective assessments are not reflected by an excessive increase of the economic vote
from 2004 to 2009. Instead the European voters appear to be able to derive the information
necessary to attribute blame or form expectations about the competence of (incumbent)
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politicians. Obviously, the voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections do not hold
their governments directly and personally responsible for the world financial and economic
crisis, consider the economic downfall an exogeneous, external effect, and refrain from
retrospective and/ or prospective economic voting. The low extent of economic voting in
2009, as opposed to more effective consequences of the economy on voting behaviour in
2004, underscores the ability and preparedness of voters to extract signals from real-world
economic developments.
6 Conclusion
The analyses in this paper support the virtual universal belief that elections to political
office are at least partly “referenda over the economy” (Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 1).
Building on differently operationalized key variables and statistical estimation techniques
the political consequences of economic development are indeed very robust, statistically
significant, and politically meaningful. The second main finding underscores the context-
dependency of the economic vote. Part of the variation is explained by economic key
indicators, by socioeconomic institutions like welfare regimes, and by political institutions
which affect the accountability and responsibility of political agents.
The EES provide an ideal empirical foundation of the analysis of voting behaviour in
general and of the economic vote in particular. They do not only provide rich empirical
data to explore electoral behaviour at the individual level, but also allow to explore the
robustness of alleged causal relations across the contexts of the EU member states and
over time. In other words the systematic multilevel structure of the EES cannot only be
utilized for an analysis of the specifics of EP elections, but rather contribute to the general
understanding of economic voting.
While this draft paper has concentrated on the presentation of descriptive evidence on
the economic vote, on references to its contextual variation and offered some preliminary
causal explanations, there are still a number of lose ends which need to be integrated so
as to provide a substantively interesting and theoretically meaningful picture of this phe-
nomenon. For instance, the systemic features of the economic vote in political competition
need more systematic exploration. So as to assess the potential political consequences, one
needs to consider that not all voters do employ the same mechanism of electoral behaviour,
but are prone to be significantly affected by these consideration to a very different extent.
Voters who hold a strong party identification and thus prefer a specific party to all others
by a wide margin will not too often be affected by the economic vote. In contrast vot-
ers with (almost) tied preference hierarchies might react even to very small, infinitesimal
perceived booms and slumps of the economy and are thus likely “economic voters”.
Moreover, future versions of this paper need to explore the supply side of EP elections
more carefully and systematically. When economic voting, as many contributions suggest,
is driven by electoral cycles which are at least partly controlled by the incumbent govern-
ments the specifics of second-order elections to the EP as opposed to first-order elections
to the national parliaments may be accounted for by determining the position of the EP
elections within the national economic cycles.
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